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In this short note we want to introduce anonymous obliv-
ious transfer a new cryptographic primitive which can be
proven to be strictly more powerful than oblivious transfer.
We show that all functions can be robustly realized by multi
party protocols with anonymous oblivious transfer. No as-
sumption about possible collusions of cheaters or disruptors
have to be made.
Furthermore we shortly discuss how to realize anonymous
oblivious transfer with oblivious broadcast or by quantum
cryptography. The protocol of anonymous oblivious transfer
was inspired by a quantum protocol: the anonymous quantum
channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
In [2,8,6] multi party protocols with oblivious transfer
were presented which can tolerate a dishonest majority.
These protocols work with perfect security if all play-
ers cooperate. But already one disruptor can abort the
protocol without being detected. The contribution of [1]
were protocols more robust against disruption. The idea
was to replace two party subprotocols which failed by
multi party protocols. Then either these protocols did
work or a cheater could be identified.
Unfortunately replacing an oblivious transfer where
the sender or the receiver refuses to coopertate by a multi
party protocol weakens the security of the protocol. In [1]
we can observe a trade off between the size of a tolera-
ble collusion of active cheaters (including disruptors) and
the size of a collusion of passive cheaters unable to obtain
secret data.
In this paper we present the new cryptographic prim-
itive anonymous oblivious transfer and prove that it is
strictly more powerful than oblivious transfer. With this
primitive we can realize multi party protocols which work
with perfect security or a cheater can be identified un-
ambigiously. As we cannot expect higher robustness and
security than that we claim that anonymous oblivious
transfer is the most powerful cryptographic primitive
which can achieve unconditional security. We recently
learned about independent work in this direction carried
out by [7].
II. MULTI PARTY PROTOCOLS
In a multi party protocol a set P of players wants
to correctly compute a function f(a1, . . . , an) which de-
pends on secret inputs of n players. Some players might
collude to cheat in the protocol as to obtain information
about secret inputs of the other players or to modify the
result of the computation. Possible collusions of cheaters
are modelled by adversary structures
Definition 1 An adversary structure is a monotone set
A ⊆ 2P , i. e., for subsets S′ ⊆ S of P the property S ∈ A
implies S′ ∈ A.
We assume that one set A ∈ A of players collude to
cheat in the protocol. These players take all their action
based on their common knowledge.
The main properties of a multi party protocol are:
1. A multi party protocol is said to be A-secure if no single
collusion from A is able to obtain information about the
secret inputs of other participants which cannot be derived
from the result and the inputs of the colluding players.
2. A multi party protocol is A-partially correct if no possible
collusion can let the protocol terminate with a wrong result.
3. A multi party protocol is called A-fair if no collusion from
A can reconstruct the result of the multi party computation
earlier then all honest participants together. No collusion
should be able to run off with the result.
We will be more strict here and demand robustness
even against disruptors.
2’ A multi party protocol is A-correct whenever no single col-
lusion from A can abort the protocol, modify its result, or
take actions such that some player gets to know a secret
value.
A protocol is called A-robust if it has all of the above
properties. Note that we will allow only one collusion
to cheat, but we think of every single player as being
curious, i. e., even if he is not in the collusion actually
cheating he will eavesdrop all information he can obtain
without being detected cheating
With oblivious transfer all multi party protocols can
be realized with perfect security if all players are coop-
erating [2,8,6]. But a collusion of players can abort the
calculation, see next section.
III. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS
In this section we show that oblivious transfer is not
able to implement all multi party protocols in the pres-
ence of cheaters which can derivate arbitrarily from the
protocol. Not even together with a broadcast channel.
Protocols offering perfect secrecy of the inputs can be
aborted by a collusion of players.
Lemma 2 Let P be a set of players for which each pair of
players is connected by a secure and authenticated obliv-
ious transfer channel and each player has access to a
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broadcast channel. Then A-robust multi party compu-
tations are possible for all functions if and only if no two
sets of A cover P \ {Pi} for a player Pi ∈ P or |P | = 2.
Proof: Let A and B be two possible collusions cov-
ering P \ {Pi}, then oblivious transfer cannot be imple-
mented A-robustly between players of A and players of
B. Between any two players Alice ∈ A and Bob ∈ B the
oblivious transfer channel does not work, but it is not ob-
vious for the player Pi who is refusing to cooperate. The
player Pi must assist Alice and Bob. As no other player
can assist we are in the three party situation with an
oblivious transfer channel only between Alice and Pi and
Bob and Pi. For each bit being transferred from Alice to
Bob the player Pi knows either as much as Alice about
this bit or he knows as much as Bob. The players Alice
and Bob cannot agree on a bit known to both without
Pi knowing it, too. Hence oblivious transfer from Alice
to Bob becomes impossible without Pi having to learn a
secret of Alice or a secret of Bob. ✷
IV. MULTI PARTY PROTOCOLS
In the multi party protocols of [6,1] a collusion of dis-
ruptors can abort the protocol if an assumption about
possible collusions of disruptors is violated. We would
like to have cryptographic primitives where every time a
conflict arises a cheater can be identified. Two such prim-
itives are global bit commitment and undeniable oblivious
transfer. We will show in the following that these primi-
tives, defined below, can realize the subprotocols needed
in [6,1] relative to no assumptions about possible collu-
sions.
Definition 3 A global bit commitment (GBC) binds a
player to all other players to the same bit in a way that
this bit cannot be changed with a non negligible probability
unless the player colludes with all other players.
Definition 4 An undeniable oblivious transfer (UOT)
protocol from a player Alice ∈ P to a player Bob ∈ P
allows Alice to generate a GBC for a bit b in a way that
Bob learns the bit b with probability 1/2 and Alice cannot
know if Bob learned b.
Now we introduce the notions used for the multi party
protocols.
Definition 5 A global bit commitment with Xor
(GBCX) to a bit b is a GBC to bits b1L, b2L, . . . , bmL,
b1R, . . . , bmR such that for each i biL ⊕ biR = b.
One important ability of these bit cimmitments with
Xor is given in the next result, which is taken from [6],
but see also references therein.
Theorem 6 GBCX allow zero knowledge proofs of lin-
ear relations among several bits a player is committed to
using GBCX. Especially (in)equality of bits or a bit string
being contained in a linear code.
Furthermore GBCXs can be copied, as proofs may de-
stroy a GBCX.
Proof: We will not state a full proof here as it can be
found in [6]. But we will restate the copying procedure
as it is an important subprotocol of all of the following
protocols.
Suppose Alice is committed to Bob to a bit b and wants
two instances of this commitment. Then Alice ceates 3m
pairs of global bit commitments such that each pair Xors
to b. Then all other player, by coin tossing, randomly
partition these 3m pairs in three subsets of m pairs, thus
obtaining three GBCX and ask Alice to prove the equal-
ity of the first new BCX with her GBCX for b. This
destroys the old GBCX and one of the new GBCX, but
an honest Alice can thereby convince all players that the
two remaining GBCX both stand for the value b. ✷
The basic building block for multi party protocols of [6]
are distributed bit commitments, where each player is
committed to a share of a bit.
Definition 7 A distributed bit commitment (DBC) of a
user Alice ∈ P to a bit b consists of n GBCX one created
by each player of P such that only Alice knows how to
open all of them and the Xor of all values ot the GBCX
equals b.
An intermediate result DBC consists of n GBCX such
that no subset of players unequal P can know how to open
all of the GBCX.
Lemma 8 With a protocol for generating GBCX and a
broadcast channel one can realize a DBC of a user.
Proof: Each player generates a GBCX and opens the
commitment to Alice. In case of a conflict the player
opens his GBCX publicly. Then Alice creates a GBCX
such that the parity bit is the bit she wanted to create a
DBC for. Only Alice knows how to open all commitments
as she created one herself. ✷
The intermediate result DBCs are automatically gen-
erated by the multi party protocols for these we need the
key protocol of [6].
Definition 9 Given two players Alice and Bob where Al-
ice is committed to bits b0, b1 and Bob is committed to
a bit a. Then a committed oblivious transfer protocol
(COT) is a protocol where Alice inputs her knowledge
about her two commitments and Bob will input his knowl-
edge about his commitment and the result will be that Bob
is committed to ba.
In a global committed oblivious transfer protocol
(GCOT) all players are convinced of the validity of the
commitments, i.e., that indeed Bob is committed to ba
after the protocol.
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For the next result we use one-out-of-two UOT, which
is the usual one-out-of-two OT, but the sender is (by
GBCs) committed to the two bits the receiver can choose
from. The standard reduction from one-out-of-two OT to
OT can be used to turn UOT into one-out-of-two UOT.
Lemma 10 With UOT and an authenticated broadcast
channel one can realize GCOT.
Proof: We will essentially restate the GCOT protocol
of [6] and see that with one-out-of-two UOT instead of
one-out-of-two OT any conflict results in the identifica-
tion of a cheater.
GCOT(a0, a1)(b)
1. All participants together choose one decodable [m, k, d]
linear code C with k > (1/2 + 2σ)m and d > ǫn for
positive constants σ, ǫ, efficiently decoding t errors.
2. Alice randomly picks c0, c1 ∈ C, committs to the bits c
i
0
and ci1 (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) of the code words, and proves
that the codewords fulfil the linear relations of C.
3. Bob randomly picks I0, I1 ⊂ {1, . . . ,M}, with |I0| =
|I1| = σm, I1 ∩ I0 = ∅ and sets b
i ← b for i ∈ I0 and
bi ← b for i 6∈ I0.
4. Alice runs UOT(ci0, c
i
1)(b
i) with Bob who gets wi for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Bob tells I = I0 ∪ I1 to Alice who
opens ci0, c
i
1 for each i ∈ I .
5. Bob checks that wi = ci
b
for i ∈ I0 and w
i = cib for
i ∈ I1, sets w
i ← cib, for i ∈ I0 and corrects w using C’s
decoding algorithm, commits to wi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
and proves that w1 . . . wm ∈ C.
6. All players together randomly pick a subset I2 ⊂
{1, . . . ,m} with |I2| = σm, I2 ∩ I = ∅ and Alice opens
ci0 and c
i
1 for i ∈ I2.
7. Bob proves that wi = cib for i ∈ I2.
8. Alice randomly picks and announces a privacy ampli-
fication function h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} such that a0 =
h(c0) and a1 = h(c1) and proves a0 = h(c
1
0, . . . , c
m
0 ) and
a1 = h(c
1
1, . . . , c
m
1 ).
9. Bob sets a ← h(w), commits to a and proves a =
h(w1 . . . , wm).
A conflict between Alice and Bob can only appear in
connection with step 4 or step 5. If these two steps would
be performed honestly then all other steps can be checked
by all other players and it becomes immediately clear who
is cheating. In a conflict in connection with step 4 or step
5 Bob claims that Alice sent something inconsistent over
the oblivious transfer channel or Alice accuses Bob to not
have committed to what he received.
In case of a conflict Alice opens all bits of c0, c1 to
which she is committed by the UOT also she opens her
GBCX to these codewords, if she is not able to do it or
unveils non code words or other inconsistent information
she is detected cheating. The bits of c0, c1 do not give
away any secret as these are random code words. If Al-
ices information is correctly unveiled and is consistent
with all her past actions (proofs) then Bob was cheating
if he did complain. If it was Alice complaining Bob has
to prove zero knowledgly that the bit string w he is com-
mitted to equals c0 or equals c1 if he is able to convince
all other players Alice is detected cheating (conflicts ap-
pearing during the proofs can be resolved easily as it is
obvious for every player who is cheating). ✷
One other important property of multi party protocols
is fairness. A multi party protocol is called fair if no col-
lusion of players can reconstruct the result of the protocol
earlier than all honest players. This problem is solved in
the literature [4,8] and will not be discussed here.
Hence we have everything to follow the protocols of [6]
robustly and in the following we need only to prove that
a certain cryptographic primitive can realize GBC (or
GBCX) and UOT and we know that it is capable of real-
izing all multi party protocols with perfect security and
robustness.
Theorem 11 Given a set of players P such that every
player can generate global bit commitments and we have
an undeniable oblivious transfer between every pair of
players. Then all functions can be computed 2P -robustly
by multi party protocols.
Proof: First we note that we do not need a broad-
cast channel as generating a GBC and unveiling it can
be viewed as broadcasting. We now sketch the phases of
a multi party protocol following [6]. To implement obliv-
ious circuit evaluation to realize arbitrary functions we
have to show the existence of an AND and a NOT func-
tion on DBCs and clearify how a protocol is initialized
and how it is ended.
Initialization Phase: All players have to agree on
the function to be computed as well as on the circuit F
to be used, they have to agree on an adversary structure
A such that the protocol will be A robust and all players
have to agree on the security parameters used and on a
code C for the GCOT protocol.
Then all players create DBCs to commit to their in-
puts.
Computing Phase: The circuit is evaluated using
AND and NOT gates on the input DBCs.
An AND on commitments can be realized by the fol-
lowing protocol: Alice is committed to a and Bob is com-
mitted to b. Then Alice chooses a random bit a′ and
runs GCOT(a′, a′⊕a)(b) with Bob who gets b′. We have
a′⊕b′ = a∧b because for b = 0 we have b′ = a′ and hence
a′ ⊕ b′ = 0, for b = 1 we get b′ = a⊕ a′ and a′ ⊕ b′ = a.
To evaluate an AND on DBCs we observe that
(
⊕n
i=1 ai) ∧ (
⊕n
j=1 bj) =
⊕n
i,j=1(ai ∧ bj). From this we
can conclude that an AND operation on DBCs can be
realized by n2 GPAND one for each pair of players and
Xor operations for each player.
To implement the NOT gate one player is picked who
must invert his “share”. This players generates a new
GBCX and proves that it is unequal to the GBCX he held
before. Note that the GCOT within the AND protocol
has to work only in one direction between every pair of
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players. Sometimes one needs several copies of a DBC.
A DBC is copied by copying the GBCX it consists of. A
GBCX can be copied by copying all its BCX with the
procedure of Theorem 6.
Revelation Phase: The result of a computation is
hidden in DBCs. These have to be unveiled in a way to
ensure the fairness of the protocol. Following [6] we use
the techniques from [4,8] to gradually unveil the secret
information such that no collusion can run off with an
advantage of more than a fraction of a bit. Of course an
A˜-secure protocol cannot be more than A˜-fair. ✷
V. ANONYMOUS OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
We next define anonymous oblivious transfer.
Definition 12 An anonymous oblivious transfer (AOT)
protocol allows a player Alice ∈ P to send a bit string
b1 . . . bm to a player Bob ∈ P such that Bob receives each
bit of the bit string with probability 1/2 or he receives
⊥ which indicates that he will not learn this bit. Alice
cannot know which bits Bob received. Furthermore Bob
does not know which player sent the bit string.
For the following we will need some subprotocols which
can easily be realized by AOT. To realize them we need
a message authentication function Auth(x, y) which out-
puts a string which authenticats the message x with the
secret y, see [11,3] for an unconditional signature scheme
based on such a function and anonymous transfer.
Lemma 13 With AOT one can realize an authenticated
broadcast channel.
Proof: Every player sends l times anonymously a ran-
dom number to Alice. Alice sends her messagem to every
player together with Auth(m, r) for all random numbers
r Alice received. 1 Then every pair of players compares
the message they received. Either they are all the same
and the protocol was successful or two different messages
show up (one might be the empty message). Now two
cases can happen:
1. The second message is correctly authenticated,
then we have a high probability (depending on l)
that the sender Alice was cheating or
2. the second message is not correctly authenticated.
In both cases we repeat the protocol until one of the
following cases holds:
1. The protocol was successful.
1This can be seen as “signing” the message [11,3].
2. Alice is in conflict with all other players and has to
leave the protocol.
3. The players complaining about Alice are always the
same, then these must be cheating as Alice cannot
know who sent which random number.
4. Enough different correctly authenticated messages
are found such that the probability that Alice is
cheating is above a certain threshold and she is ex-
pelled from the protocol.
✷
Lemma 14 With AOT one can realize anonymous mes-
sage transfer and an anonymous broadcast channel which
can fail only n times or someone leaves the protocol.
Proof: To send a message anonymously one has to
encode the message with an error correcting code to cope
with the erasures of the AOT.
For an anonymous broadcast Alice sends her message
m anonymously to a player Pi. This player broadcasts
the message. If he broadcasts something wrong Alice is
in conflict with this player, complains about him using
the authenticated broadcast, and picks another player
Pj to start the procedure anew. Either the anonymous
broadcast will eventually be successfull or Alice will leave
the protocol as she is in conflict with all other players. ✷
Corollary 15 With AOT one can realize the anonymous
message transfer and anonymous broadcast of Lemma 14
in a way that the anonymous sender can later identify
himself.
Proof: For an anonymous broadcast with later iden-
tification Alice authenticates her message m with n ran-
dom numbers which she sends anonymously to the play-
ers. Each player receives one random number.
Then she anonymously broadcasts the thus authenti-
cated message according to Lemma 14. No other player
is later able to impersonate Alice as only she knows the
secret random numbers of the honest players. ✷
With these protocols we can realize GBCX.
Lemma 16 With AOT one can realize GBCX.
Proof: We let all players create GBCX according to
the protocol of [6], but anonymously, using AOT and
anonymous broadcast. Then after some time no new con-
flicts occur for l anonymous GBCX of each player (l is a
security parameter which is polynomial in n). If a player
Alice was unable to create a GBCX we will split the set
of players in a way that one set contains all honest play-
ers and the other sets contain only cheaters. We explain
this in more detail by the two cases which can occur:
1. If Alice was honest then, as a cheater cannot distin-
guish between the honest players after some time
if the cheater keeps complaining about Alice this
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cheater will be in conflict with all honest players.
Furthermore all honest players will know it. Now
we can seperate the set P of players several subsets
such that all players in each subset are in conflict
with the same players. Then we can be sure that
one of the sets contains all honest players and every
honest player knows it.
2. If Alice was dishonest then we will also seperate the
set P . Alice will be in one group with all players
complaining about the same players as Alice did
(these are all honest players if Alice were honest)
all other players will be in the other sets. As Alice
is a cheater and hence in conflict with an honest
player all players in her group must be cheaters,
too.
✷
Note that the protocol to create GBCX for all players
needs only polynomial time in n, as only n2 conflicts are
possible.
After having realized GBCX we need to implement
UOT.
Lemma 17 With AOT one can realize UOT.
Proof: Alice creates a GBCX following Lemma 16 and
Bob publishes positions of two substrings of the strings
Alice sent to him. One substring where he knows all
the bits and one substring where he knows nothing. The
substrings must have approximately the same length.
Alice publishes the bits of one of the substrings. Then
Bob either learnt nothing new or he knows the bit Alice
is committed to. We have realized UOT if we can show
that no other player learns the bit Alice is committed to
by the information published by Alice, but this is trivial
as Alice sent different strings to different players. ✷
VI. REALIZING AOT
A. Quantum Protocols
Anonymous oblivious transfer was inspired by a quan-
tum protocol [9]. But it cannot be realized by a quantum
protocol unless no two possible collusions cover the set P
of players.
The idea for the realization is to follow normal quan-
tum multi party protocols [10] if not two sets covering
P \Pi are in conflict. In case of such a conflict the player
Pi is not a disruptor or active cheater by assumption.
This player can now forward quantum information be-
tween the two sets which are in conflict. Quantum cryp-
tography allows to keep the player Pi from eavesdropping
the quantum data excluding what happened in Lemma 2.
As the player Pi can forward all quantum information in
the same way and send quantum information himself this
realizes an anonymous quantum channel. Together with
the results of [10] we get:
Theorem 18 Robust quantum multi party protocols for
all functions are possible if and only if no two possible
collusions cover the set P of players.
These protocols become robust against a set of possible
collusions after termination which may contain one and
only one complement of a collusion tolerable during the
execution of the protocol.
For a proof see [9].
Especially a quantum channel can be more powerfel
than oblivious transfer (See Lemma 2). For details please
refer to [10,9].
B. Oblivios Broadcast
We can think of each player broadcasting weak signals.
Signals which can be received only with a certain prob-
ability which is independent for all receiving players. In
this subsection we want to show that this primitive is
equally powerful as AOT.
Definition 19 An oblivious broadcast channel is a pro-
tocol where a player inputs a bit string and every other
player receives the output of an oblivious transfer of this
string and the erasures are independent for the different
players.
Lemma 20 An authenticated oblivious broadcast can re-
alize a GBC.
Proof: Alice sends, as a commitment, k bit strings of
length m (k, m are security parameters which are poly-
nomial in n) with parity b. Then the knowledge all other
players have about b is negligible inm. Because the prob-
ability that a bit is received by at least one player is
1 − 1/2n and the probability that all players together
have knowledge about all m is (1− 1/2n)m which is neg-
ligible in m. If k strings are sent the probability remains
negligible as k and m are polynomial in n.
If Alice wanted to change the bit she committed to she
has to change k bits. The probability that any single
player does not detect this change is negligible in k. ✷
Lemma 21 An authenticated oblivious broadcast can re-
alize UOT.
Proof: Alice creates a GBC and Bob publishes posi-
tions of two substrings of the strings Alice sent over the
oblivious broadcast. One substring where he knows all
the bits and one substring where he knows nothing. The
substrings must have approximately the same length.
Alice publishes the bits of one of the substrings. Then
Bob either learnt nothing new or he knows the bit Al-
ice is committed to. We have realized UOT if we can
show that no other player learns the bit Alice is com-
mitted to by the information published by Alice. But
as the substrings published are statistically independent
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of what the other players received this information just
changes the probability of receiving a bit for each player.
This change of probability can be coped with an suitable
choice of the security parameters used in Lemma 20. ✷
VII. MAIN RESULT
Summarizing all of the above we can state:
Theorem 22 The primitive of anonymous oblivious
transfer is cryptographically strictly more powerful than
oblivious transfer. It can realize all multi party proto-
cols with a security and robustness which is independent
from assumptions about possible collusions of cheaters or
disruptors.
Anonymous oblivious transfer can be realized by an au-
thenticated oblivious broadcast channel or by a quantum
protocol if no two possible collusions cover the set of play-
ers.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
An interesting question is if a noisy broadcast channel
is of the same power as AOT. This seems to be clear
for small sets of players, but if the number of players
grow large the difference between the error probabilities
possible for different collusions becomes large, too. If all
players collude against the sender the probability of error
is much lower as if all players collude against the receiver.
To kope with this problem will be an interesting direction
of future research.
There probably are many other primitives of a crypto-
graphic power equivalent to AOT. This has to be inves-
tigated to maybe find primitives which can be realized
more easily or more efficiently (compare [7]).
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